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Banks are for people with money rather than for people without money. However, 
microfinance is banking for the unbankables. It brings credit, loan, savings and other 
essential financial services within the reach of millions of people who are too poor to be 
served by regular banks, i.e. almost 60-90% of the global population. It is one of the most 
intriguing features of financial economics today.  
  In the aftermath of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the Bangladeshi, 
Mohammed Yunus, who is a champion of the cause for microcredit, the common 
presumption has been that microfinance creates undeniable social benefits such as poverty 
alleviation and more equal social opportunities. Indeed, this is true to a large extent; 
however, less acknowledged are the problems that lurk behind this facade of ‘social 
service’. 
  Donning the caps of economists, this paper discusses the economic rationality of 
microfinance as an effective tool for achieving poverty alleviation. We ask the question on 
whether the theoretical objective of microfinance for ‘helping the poor’ is sullied in 
practice by rent seeking, profit seeking and corruption. We assess the fundamental 
economic model for the basis on which Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) provide loans to 
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Some Background 
Imagine what would happen if the universal banking structure would crumble and all the 
financial organizations stopped working. Banks would shut down, ATMs would not be 
operating, and credit and debit cards would no longer be accepted. Millions of families 
would not be able to provide food on their dinner table. Well, this is exactly the problem 
faced by more than 60% of the global population – a nightmare they endure very day. 
  Therefore, the need for microfinance is quite startling. One of the primary lessons in 
economics is that of ‘diminishing marginal returns’ which would suggest that enterprises 
with little capital (or poor entrepreneurs) earn higher returns on their investment because 
they utilize less capital. While the net output of such enterprises may not be high, on each 
additional unit of output, their marginal returns will be greater. Similarly, organizations 
with greater capital at their disposal (richer entrepreneurs) use more capital and hence 
produce a higher net output, but their marginal returns from each additional unit is 
smaller too. 
  According to this law, poor entrepreneurs will earn more on each additional unit and 
hence they will be able to pay higher interest as compared to a richer entrepreneur. This 
would suggest that the willingness to finance smaller enterprises and poorer entrepreneurs 
should be high. However, reality does not follow this law, primarily due to the risk 
associated to lending to unproven entrepreneurs and smaller enterprises. As a result, since 
generations, poverty has always reproduced poverty exacerbating income inequality in the 
process.  
  For mainstream financial institutions operating in the real world, the market of poor 
entrepreneurs is characterized by high operating costs and lack of financial information. 
Banks and many other commercial organizations as well as NGOs face huge transaction 
costs because the cost for handling a small transaction is very expensive simply because 
they cannot take advantage of economies of scale and scope in this market. Consequently, a 
majority of poor consumers are entirely avoided by the banks because they are seen as 
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risky and expensive, in other words, not trustworthy for repaying a loan. And this is where 
the need for microfinance was born and hence is seen as a method to break through this 
vicious circle of poverty. Seen as such, microfinance is not the first step towards poverty 
alleviation, but it is the most successful tool by far. (Armendariz and Morduch, 2007) 
 
Microfinance in the Real World - The Case of India 
To see how microfinance operates in reality, consider, for example, the usual delivery 
channels of microfinance in India. They include: 
 Grameen Banks 
 Self Help Groups (SHGs) including some NGOs 
 Micro-financial Institutions (MFIs) such as banks 
 SHG Bank Linkage Programme (SHG – BLP) 
 
  Since microfinance was initially started as “banking for the poor”, credit checks and 
collateral security is still not the basis for providing loans to the poor for most models of 
microfinance. 
  The most successful model in India in terms of scale and outreach is the SHG Bank Linkage 
Programme with other models lagging far behind. In 2004, around 800,000 SHGs were 
linked to the banks and together they have reached around 2 million households. Despite 
these huge numbers, their coverage covers barely 5% of all Indian poor rural households 
(Basu and Srivastava, 2004). 
  The different channels for microfinance in India seem to exhibit some interesting 
advantages compared to one another. For instance, informal microfinance institutions 
(SHGs) formed mutually among borrowers are closer to the grass root level and more 
capable at dealing with the credit assessment of the urban poor. They are thereby able to 
lower the transaction costs of loan processing. On the other hand, the formal financial 
sector has a wider resource base and the related ability to expediently mobilize the funds 
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required, thereby reducing the cost capital for SHGs. Further, both formal and informal 
sectors reduce overall transaction costs and increase their expected profit because of lower 
default rates on lending portfolios (less than 1% compared to banks 11 to 12%) (Tiwari and 
Fahad n.d).  As for the borrowers, loans can be readily available at SHGs at lower rates 
because of the low cost of processing and easy access to finance through bank linkages.  
  This SHG model operates by forming a group to save capital, which is then deposited in an 
account at a bank. The group then applies for a loan by offering their savings and group 
guarantee as a collateral. Normally banks provide loans amounting to four times the 
accumulated savings which can be increased further on the basis of the group’s track 
record on the previous loans. Borrowed and saved money are then circulated through 
lending within the group with usual monthly repayments. Any single default on part of the 
entire group has the consequence of the bank stopping further loan instalments, putting a 
stop on the flow of capital to the group which can lead to a loss in their business activities.   
This disciplinary mechanism results in loan repayments being around 98% in these cases. 
(Basu and Srivastava, 2004). 
  Microcredit also provides the poor with an opportunity to have some consumer surplus 
which occurs when the cost of the loans they receive is lower than their reservation price 
for entering into entrepreneurship. Through entrepreneurship the rise in income, standard 
of living, security, etc is worth more than the interest rate that they pay on the loan 
borrowed. There is also producer surplus as the expectancy of loan repayment is higher 
than in the normal case. 
  Now to further understand the in-depth coverage of microfinance let us look at its market 
model. 
 
A Market Analysis for Microfinance 
The kind of market in which the MFIs operate can be understood as being  monopolistically 
competitive wherein there are number of buyers and sellers, there is free entry and exit 
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and the product sold is differentiated (viz. different maturity periods, terms, interest rates, 
etc.).  
  We shall assume that the demand curve represents the price a borrower is willing to pay 
to take a loan and the supply curve represents the number of loans offered by MFIs. 
  The existing market conditions in developing countries indicate that the demand for 
micro loans outstrips its supply. Therefore, at prices for such a loan that would reflect the 
purported benefits of microfinance most accurately, there is excess demand, whereas at the 
prevailing equilibrium price the benefits are arguably much more muted. In competitive 
market conditions, when there is excess of demand over supply in the market, new 
suppliers would enter the market so as to benefit from the potential to earn short term 
economic profit, shifting the supply curve towards right and adjusting the equilibrium 
price downward. Restricting this scenario are the government regulations preventing new 
entry by imposing stringent capital adequacy and complex supervisory and reporting 
requirements and further non supportive infrastructure facilities. 
  Unfortunately microfinance in India still has a lot to cover and many to reach. The 
particular models offered at present still result in a lot of spatial inequality in terms of the 
coverage of clients – microfinance remains more accessible in urban areas whereas it 
should ideally reach the most vulnerable clients in remote areas. Thus there is still glaring 
inequalities to access that requires addressing. 
 
Externalities 
Despite its theoretical positive impacts, the real world progress of microfinance is still very 
restricted owing to a number of reasons. First, microfinance is intrinsically a very 
convoluted service to comprehend and hence its uptake is very slow. Reduced uptake levels 
increase the transaction costs making microfinance costlier.  
  There is usually an inverse correlation (trade off) between the size of a portfolio and the 
break-even premium that plagues microfinance acutely. This is because if MFIs were to 
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raise their premiums, it would limit accessibility to the poor. Conversely, if the premiums 
are kept low and participation is encouraged it could potentially make microfinance 
financially unviable. The latter seems to be a more suitable approach but the problem is 
that any program has to survive until it reaches its break-even point. The ability of 
microfinance in assuaging poverty in the longer term without becoming financially 
unviable in the short term is essentially the crux of the problem.  
  Another problem is the bundling of microfinance programs which refers to different 
microfinance programs operating collectively. For e.g. the “group lending” model by 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, wherein if one individual fails to repay, the others in the 
group are held responsible. However, doing this may lead to collusion between the 
microfinance service providers which may increase their market power and give rise to 
competition concerns. (Islam, 2009) 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Microfinance has generated contradictory responses and divisive views. On the one hand 
are the people who think that microfinance is panacea and can extricate billions of people 
out of poverty. On the other hand there are critics who discount the real world benefits of 
microfinance as exaggerated.  
  We would like to conclude in the middle ground in that microfinance does seem to have a 
significant potential for poverty reduction, provided it can be put into practice in a manner 
that addresses the problems of asymmetric access and market participation. 
  Regardless of its criticisms, if implemented in its authentic sense, the following saying 
would ring true: 
“Give a man a fish; he will eat for a day. Give a woman microcredit, she, her husband, 
her children and her extended family will eat for a lifetime.” Bono 
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